Infinite, nothing.—The soul of man is cast into the body, in which it finds number, time, dimension;
it reasons thereon, and calls this nature or necessity, and cannot believe aught else.
Unity joined to infinity increases it not, any more than a foot measure added to infinite
space. The finite is annihilated in presence of the infinite and becomes simply nought.
Thus our intellect before God, thus our justice before the divine justice. There is
not so great a disproportion between our justice and that of God, as between unity
and infinity.
The justice of God must be as vast as his mercy, but justice towards the reprobate
is less vast, and should be less amazing than mercy towards the elect.
We know that there is an infinite, but are ignorant of its nature. As we know it to
be false that numbers are finite, it must therefore be true that there is an infinity
in number, but what this is we know not. It can neither be odd nor even, for the addition
of an unit can make no change in the nature of number; yet it is a number, and every
number is either odd or even, at least this is understood of every finite number.
Thus we may well know that there is a God, without knowing what he is.
We know then the existence and the nature of the finite, because we also are finite
and have dimension.
We know the existence of the infinite, and are ignorant of its nature, because it
has dimension like us, but not limits like us. But we know neither the existence nor
the nature of God, because he has neither dimension nor limits.
But by faith we know his existence, by glory we shall know his nature. Now I have
already shown that we can know well the existence of a thing without knowing its nature.
Let us now speak according to the light of nature.
If there be a God, he is infinitely incomprehensible, since having neither parts nor
limits he has no relation to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what he is
or if he is. This being so, who will dare to undertake the solution of the question?
Not we, who have no relation to him.
Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for their faith;
those who profess a religion for which they cannot give a reason? They declare in
putting it forth to the world that it is a foolishness, stultitiam, and then you complain that they do not prove it. Were they to prove it they would
not keep their word, it is in lacking proof that they are not lacking in sense.—Yes,
but although this excuses those who offer it as such, and takes away from them the
blame of putting it forth without reason, it does not excuse those who receive it.—Let
us then examine this point, and say “God is, or he is not.” But to which side shall
we incline? Reason can determine nothing about it. There is an infinite gulf fixed
between us. A game is playing at the extremity of this infinite distance in which
heads or tails may turn up. What will you wager? There is no reason for backing either
one or the other, you cannot reasonably argue in favour of either.
Do not then accuse of error those who have already chosen, for you know nothing about
it.—No, but I blame them for having made, not this choice, but a choice, for again
both the man who calls ‘heads’ and his adversary are equally to blame, they are both
in the wrong; the true course is not to wager at all.—
Yes, but you must wager; this depends not on your will, you are embarked in the affair.
Which will you choose? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which least interests
you. You have two things to lose, truth and good, and two things to stake, your reason
and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to
avoid, error and misery. Since you must needs choose, your reason is no more wounded
in choosing one than the other. Here is one point cleared up, but what of your happiness?
Let us weigh the gain and the loss in choosing heads that God is. Let us weigh the
two cases: if you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager then unhesitatingly
that he is.—You are right. Yes, I must wager, but I may stake too much.—Let us see.
Since there is an equal chance of gain and loss, if you had only to gain two lives
for one, you might still wager. But were there three of them to gain, you would have
to play, since needs must that you play, and you would be imprudent, since you must
play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where the chances of loss or
gain are even. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And that being so,
were there an infinity of chances of which one only would be for you, you would still
be right to stake one to win two, and you would act foolishly, being obliged to play,
did you refuse to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity
of chances there be one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy
life to win. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to win, a chance
of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite;
that is decided. Wherever the infinite exists and there is not an infinity of chances
of loss against that of gain, there is no room for hesitation, you must risk the whole.
Thus when a man is forced to play he must renounce reason to keep life, rather than
hazard it for infinite gain, which is as likely to happen as the loss of nothingness.
For it is of no avail to say it is uncertain that we gain, and certain that we risk,
and that the infinite distance between the certainty of that which is staked and the
uncertainty of what we shall gain, equals the finite good which is certainly staked
against an uncertain infinite. This is not so. Every gambler stakes a certainty to
gain an uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty against a finite uncertainty
without acting unreasonably. It is false to say there is infinite distance between
the certain stake and the uncertain gain. There is in truth an infinity between the
certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the uncertainty of gain is proportioned
to the certainty of the stake, according to the proportion of chances of gain and
loss, and if therefore there are as many chances on one side as on the other, the
game is even. And thus the certainty of the venture is equal to the uncertainty of
the winnings, so far is it from the truth that there is infinite distance between
them. So that our argument is of infinite force, if we stake the finite in a game
where there are equal chances of gain and loss, and the infinite is the winnings.
This is demonstrable, and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.